On 3 December 1984, over 500,000 people in the vicinity of the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India were exposed to the highly Toxicity gas methyl isocyanate, in what is considered the world's worst industrial disaster.*
A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused approximately 558,125 injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries. Estimates vary on the death toll, with the official number of immediate deaths being 2,259. Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks of the incident occurring, and another 8,000 or more died from gas-related diseases. In 2008, the Government of Madhya Pradesh paid compensation to the family members of victims killed in the gas release, and to the injured victims.
The owner of the factory, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), was majority-owned by the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) of the United States, with Indian government-controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470 million (equivalent to $ in ) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which subsequently merged with McLeod Russel. Eveready ended clean-up on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster.
Civil and Criminal law filed in the United States against UCC and Warren Anderson, chief executive officer of the UCC at the time of the disaster, were dismissed and redirected to Indian courts on multiple occasions between 1986 and 2012, as the US courts focused on UCIL being a standalone entity of India. Civil and criminal cases were also filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC, UCIL, and Anderson. In June 2010, seven Indian nationals who were UCIL employees in 1984, including the former UCIL chairman Keshub Mahindra, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law. All were released on bail shortly after the verdict. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was passed.
After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers (including Bayer) produced carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost. UCIL's process differed from the MIC-free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials were combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene initially reacting with 1-naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which was later reacted with methylamine. In the early 1980s, although the demand for had fallen, production continued leading to an accumulation of unused MIC at the Bhopal site.
In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective equipment. One month later in February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers. In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30% of his body. In October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During 1983 and 1984, there were leaks of MIC, chlorine, Methylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.
In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to effectively contain most of its Nitrogen pressure, which meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure, tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC. Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the shutdown of the plant's Gas flare so that a Corrosion pipe could be repaired. With the flare tower still rendered useless, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42 tons of liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it.
When the tea break concluded at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 escalated to a critical state at an alarming speed within five minutes. Temperatures in the tank were off the scale beyond , and the pressure in the tank was indicated at . One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank continued to increase to , despite atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas having begun. Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized, or otherwise rendered inoperable:
About 30 tonnes of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes. This would increase to 40 tonnes within two hours. The gases were blown in a southeast direction over Bhopal.
A UCIL employee triggered the plant's alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to tolerate. Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms: one that specifically sounded inside the UCIL plant itself and a second directed to the exterior which would alert the general public and the city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while the public one remained inactive. This is what had occurred; the public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over inconsequential leaks. Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.
Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed via telephone by a town inspector that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m. Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. elicited assurances twice that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir". With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then later phosgene. Finally, they received an updated report that it was "MIC" (rather than "methyl isocyanate"), which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and knew no immediate information about.
The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately 2 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant's public siren was sounded for an extended period of time after having been quickly silenced an hour and a half earlier. Some minutes after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had ever occurred in the first place), and said that the leak had been plugged. Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to shelter in place or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas in the first place.
Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse, and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsy revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, Fatty liver, and necrotising enteritis. The individuals who did not die suffered from cancer, blindness, loss of livelihood, and financial strain.
The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70% of doctors were underqualified. Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.
There were mass funerals and . Photographer Pablo Bartholomew, on commission with press agency Rapho, took an iconic colour photograph of a burial on 4 December, Bhopal gas disaster girl. Another photographer present, Raghu Rai, took a black and white photo. The photographers did not ask for the identity of the father or child as she was buried and no relative has since confirmed it. As such, the identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the suffering of victims of the Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew went on to win the 1985 World Press Photo of the Year.
Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren, and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited, causing further supply shortages.
Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC by reactivating the plant and continuing the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions such as having water-carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal. The Government of India passed the "Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act" that gave the government rights to represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of lack of information or misinformation were widespread. An Indian government spokesman said, "Carbide is more interested in getting information from us than in helping our relief work".
Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation, and foodstuffs were safe, but people were warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics, and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims. S. Ravi Rajan (Prof. Environmental Studies, U.C. Santa Cruz) outlines the financially driven undertones of the company's actions. UCC had participated in decades of previous instances of "environmental negligence in every part of the world", directing its "responsibility… to its shareholders", and numerous dealings with local and international political and economic powers. The company's response to the Bhopal accident was what Rajan describes as a "campaign of erasure", meaning the transfer of liability and responsibility of the cause of the gas leak, the event itself, and the aftermath. Rajan then argues that this type of response is to be expected "according to the established cultural practice" within large corporations such as UCC. Since UCC absolved itself from the situation, the Indian government was the next institution that was looked to by the people of Bhopal, but they had also not prepared for such an event. The government's attempts at short and long-term plans failed in successfully aiding victims and instead "created an ecology of opportunity… built largely at the expense of the victims."
In March 1986, UCC proposed a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs' U.S. attorneys, of that would, according to the company, "generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between over 20 years". In May, litigation was transferred from the United States to Indian courts by a U.S. District Court ruling. Following an appeal of this decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer in November 1986, judging that UCIL was a "separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India".
The Government of India refused the offer from Union Carbide, and claimed US$. The Indian Supreme Court told both sides to come to an agreement and "start with a clean slate" in November 1988. Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$ for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster. The amount was immediately paid.
Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original , dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated , to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this.
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the decision of the lower federal courts in October 1993 against allowing victims of the Bhopal disaster to seek damages in a U.S. court.
In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been "cleared".
In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City upheld the dismissal of remaining claims in the case of Bano v. Union Carbide Corporation. This move blocked plaintiffs' motions for class certification and claims for property damages and remediation. In the view of UCC, "the ruling reaffirms UCC's long-held positions and finally puts to rest—both procedurally and substantively—the issues raised in the class action complaint first filed against Union Carbide in 1999 by Haseena Bi and several organisations representing the residents of Bhopal".
In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence: Keshub Mahindra, former non-executive chairman of Union Carbide India Limited; V. P. Gokhale, managing director; Kishore Kamdar, vice-president; J. Mukund, works manager; S. P. Choudhary, production manager; K. V. Shetty, plant superintendent; and S. I. Qureshi, production assistant. They were each sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fined . All were released on bail shortly after the verdict.
A US federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, was filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against humanity". It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and the subsequent appeal was denied.
Warren Anderson, then 92 years old, died on 29 September 2014.
On 14 March 2023 Indian Supreme Court dismissed curative petition for enhanced compensation.
A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected", affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. The Sambhavna clinic "estimates 8,000 deaths during the first weeks, and another 8,000 since then".
The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.
Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.
A cohort of 80,021 exposed people was registered, along with a control group, a cohort of 15,931 people from areas not exposed to MIC. Nearly every year since 1986, they have answered the same questionnaire. It shows mortality rate and morbidity in the exposed group. Bias and confounding factors cannot be excluded from the study. Because of migration and other factors, 75% of the cohort is lost, as the ones who move out are not followed.
A number of clinical studies are performed. The quality varies, but the different reports support each other. Studied and reported long-term health effects are:
Missing or insufficient fields for research are female reproduction, chromosomal aberrations, cancer, immune deficiency, neurological sequelae, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and children born after the disaster. Late cases that might never be highlighted are respiratory insufficiency, cardiac insufficiency (cor pulmonale), cancer and tuberculosis. Bhopal now has high rates of birth defects and records a miscarriage rate 7x higher than the national average.
A 2014 report in Mother Jones quotes a "spokesperson for the Bhopal Medical Appeal, which runs free health clinics for survivors" as saying "An estimated 120,000 to 150,000 survivors still struggle with serious medical conditions including nerve damage, growth problems, gynaecological disorders, respiratory issues, birth defects, and elevated rates of cancer and tuberculosis."
In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the UCIL factory, the government of Madhya Pradesh proposed a water-supply improvement scheme. In December 2008, the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat, which was met by protests from activists all over India. On 8 June 2012, the centre for incineration of toxic Bhopal waste agreed to pay to dispose of UCIL chemical plants' waste in Germany. On 9 August 2012, Supreme court directed the Union and Madhya Pradesh Governments to take immediate steps for disposal of toxic waste lying around and inside the factory within six months.
A U.S. court rejected the lawsuit blaming UCC for causing soil and water pollution around the site of the plant and ruled that responsibility for remedial measures or related claims rested with the State Government and not with UCC. In 2005, the state government invited various Indian architects to enter their "concept for development of a memorial complex for Bhopal gas tragedy victims at the site of Union Carbide". In 2011, a conference was held on the site, with participants from European universities which was aimed for the same.
The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury, was for the majority . For death claims, the average sum paid out was . Each claimant was to be categorised by a doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" that death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically examined.
By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.
In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. The number of awarded cases was 574,304 and the number of rejected cases was 455,213. Total compensation awarded was . On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.
The "worker sabotage" point of view, held by Union Carbide, argues that it was not physically possible for the water to enter the tank without concerted human effort, and that extensive testimony and engineering analysis leads to a conclusion that water entered the tank when a rogue individual employee hooked a water hose directly to an empty valve on the side of the tank. This point of view further argues that the Indian government took extensive actions to hide this possibility in order to attach blame to UCC.
Theories differ as to how the water entered the tank. At the time, workers were cleaning out a clogged pipe with water about from the tank. They claimed that they were not told to isolate the tank with a pipe slip-blind plate. The operators assumed that owing to bad maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak into the tank.
This water entry route could not be reproduced despite strenuous efforts by motivated parties. UCC claims that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately connecting a hose to a pressure gauge connection was the real cause.
Early the next morning, a UCIL manager asked the instrument engineer to replace the gauge. UCIL's investigation team found no evidence of the necessary connection; the investigation was totally controlled by the government, denying UCC investigators access to the tank or interviews with the operators.
Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of safety practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to plant operations. By 1984, only six of the original 12 operators were still working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel had also been halved. No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the previous and required one-hour readings. Workers made complaints about the cuts through their union but were ignored. One employee was fired after going on a 15-day hunger strike. Seventy percent of the plant's employees were fined before the disaster for refusing to deviate from the proper safety regulations under pressure from the management.
In addition, some observers, such as those writing in the Trade Environmental Database (TED) Case Studies as part of the Mandala Project from American University, have pointed to "serious communication problems and management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian operation", characterised by "the parent hands-off approach to its overseas operation" and "cross-cultural barriers".Mandala Project (1996), Trade Environmental Database (TED) Case Study 233. Volume 5, Number 1, January 1996
According to the operators, the MIC tank pressure gauge had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks were used, rather than repairing the gauge. The build-up in temperature and pressure is believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas release. UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of 3 December 1984. The design of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was "Indianized" by UCIL engineers to maximise the use of indigenous materials and products. Mumbai-based Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants Pvt. Ltd., were the main consultants, Larsen & Toubro fabricated the MIC storage tanks, and Taylor of India Ltd. provided the instrumentation. In 1998, during civil action suits in India, it emerged that the plant was not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope with accidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.
A Union Carbide commissioned analysis conducted by Arthur D. Little claims that the Negligence argument was impossible for several tangible reasons:
The Union Carbide-commissioned Arthur D. Little report concluded that it was likely that a single employee secretly and deliberately introduced a large amount of water into the MIC tank by removing a meter and connecting a water hose directly to the tank through the metering port.
UCC claims the plant staff falsified numerous records to distance themselves from the accident and absolve themselves of blame, and that the Indian government impeded its investigation and declined to prosecute the employee responsible, presumably because it would weaken its allegations of negligence by Union Carbide.
The evidence advanced by UCC, alleged to support this hypothesis:
The Little report argues that this evidence demonstrates that the following chronology took place:
Roy argued to the district court that M. L. Verma, a disgruntled plant operator at odds with senior management, was behind the sabotage. The counsel argued there were discrepancies in statements given by persons operating the plant at that time, but the central agency decided against a proper investigation in order to characterize the event as a mishap and not sabotage. He alleged that Verma was unhappy with Choudhary and Mukund.
The company admitted that safety systems in place would not have been able to prevent a chemical reaction of such magnitude from causing a leak. According to Carbide, "in designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in" because "the tank's gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the system" and "process safety systems—in place and operational—would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident". Instead, they claim that "employee sabotage—not faulty design or operation—was the cause of the tragedy".
Tactical response
The company stresses the immediate action taken after the disaster and its continued commitment to helping the victims. On 4 December, the day following the leak, Union Carbide sent material aid and several international medical experts to assist the medical facilities in Bhopal.
Financial response
The primary financial restitution paid by UCC was negotiated in 1989, when the Indian Supreme Court approved a settlement of US$470 million (₹1,055 crore; equivalent to $ in ). This amount was immediately paid by UCC to the Indian government. The company states that the restitution paid "was $120 million more than plaintiffs' lawyers had told U.S. courts was fair" and that the Indian Supreme Court stated in its opinion that "compensation levels under the settlement were far greater than would normally be payable under Indian law."
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Union Carbide states on its website that it donated $2 million to the Indian prime minister's immediate disaster relief fund on 11 December 1984. The corporation established the Employees' Bhopal Relief Fund in February 1985, which raised more than for immediate relief. According to Union Carbide, in August 1987, they made an additional in humanitarian interim relief available.
Union Carbide stated that it also undertook several steps to provide continuing aid to the victims of the Bhopal disaster, including the sale of its 50.9% interest in UCIL in April 1992 and establishment of a charitable trust to contribute to the building of a local hospital. The sale was finalised in November 1994. Construction began in October 1995 and the hospital opened in 2001. The company provided a fund of around from sale of its UCIL stock. In 1991, the trust had amounted to approximately . The hospital specialized in the treatment of heart, lung and eye problems. UCC also provided a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish a vocational-technical centre in Bhopal, which was opened, but was later closed by the state government. They also donated $5 million to the Indian Red Cross after the disaster. They also developed a Responsible Care system with other members of the chemical industry as a response to the Bhopal crisis, which was designed to help prevent such an event in the future.
In May 1988, Indian businessman J. R. D. Tata wrote a confidential letter to the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, conveying Henry Kissinger concern about delay in reaching a settlement. At the time, Kissinger was an adviser to Union Carbide and other US corporations. Rajiv Gandhi indicated that he would consider Kissinger's advice. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party alleged that Rajiv Gandhi protected Warren Anderson in a secret political deal with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, with Gandhi securing Reagan's pardon of Adil Shahryar in exchange.
Dow was a named respondent in cases arising from Union Carbide's business in Bhopal.
UCC's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory were toxic to fish. Twenty-one areas inside the plant were reported to be highly polluted. In 1991 the municipal authorities declared that water from over 100 wells was hazardous for health if used for drinking. In 1994 it was reported that 21% of the factory premises were seriously contaminated with chemicals.Down to Earth (2003). Beginning in 1999, studies made by Greenpeace and others from soil, groundwater, Water well and vegetables from the residential areas around UCIL and from the UCIL factory area show contamination with a range of toxic heavy metals and chemical compounds. Substances found, according to the reports, are 1-Naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residues, organochlorines, mercury, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachlorethane, hexachlorobutadiene, pesticide HCH, volatile organic compounds and halo-organics. Many of these contaminants were also found in breast milk of women living near the area. Soil tests were conducted by Greenpeace in 1999. One sample (IT9012) from "sediment collected from drain under former Sevin plant" showed mercury levels to be at "20,000 and times" higher than expected levels. Organochlorine compounds at elevated levels were also present in groundwater collected from (sample IT9040) a depth "bore-hole within the former UCIL site". This sample was obtained from a source posted with a warning sign which read "Water unfit for consumption". Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as trichloroethylene, known to impair foetal development, at 50 times above safety limits specified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In 2002, an inquiry by Fact-Finding Mission on Bhopal found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5 trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing women's breast milk.
A 2004 BBC Radio 5 broadcast reported the site is contaminated with toxic chemicals including hexachlorocyclohexane and mercury, held in open containers or loose on the ground. A drinking water sample from a well near the site had levels of contamination 500 times higher than the maximum limits recommended by the World Health Organization. In 2009, the Centre for Science and Environment, a Delhi-based pollution monitoring lab, released test results showing pesticide groundwater contamination up to three kilometres from the factory. Also in 2009, the BBC took a water sample from a frequently used hand pump, located just north of the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain 1,000 times the World Health Organization's recommended maximum amount of carbon tetrachloride, which causes liver and kidney damage, and is "possibly carcinogenic to humans".
In 2010, a British photojournalist ventured into the abandoned UCIL factory to investigate allegations of abandoned, leaking toxins. He was hospitalized in Bhopal for a week after he was exposed to chemicals. Doctors at the Sambhavna clinic treated him with oxygen, painkillers and anti-inflammatories following a severe respiratory reaction to toxic dust inside the factory.
In October 2011, the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment published an article and video by two British environmental scientists, showing the current state of the plant, landfill and solar evaporation ponds and calling for renewed international efforts to provide the necessary skills to clean up the site and contaminated groundwater.
On December 3, 2024, the 40th anniversary of the incident, Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled that the site must be cleaned up in the next month. Despite protests against a plan to incinerate the hazardous waste in Pithampur, on January 1, 2025, an overnight caravan of a dozen semi trucks with police escort, a quick-response team, fire engines and ambulances delivered 377 tons of waste to Pithampur Industrial Area for incineration. Despite promises that the several hundred tons of toxic waste will be processed safely and responsibly, protests continued in Pithampur.
Numerous actions have been taken: demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, marches combined with pamphlets, books, and articles. Every anniversary, actions are performed. Often these include marches around Old Bhopal, ending with burning an effigy of Warren Anderson.
When government aid was ineffective, activist groups such as Zahreeli Gas Khand Sangharsh Morcha (Poisonous Gas-Event Struggle Front) mobilized. Morcha was heterogenous in its membership, including gas victims, volunteers from smaller towns, and middle-class activists from large cities. Morcha outlined a four-pronged approach: 1) counter governmental and company efforts to remove the disaster from the press 2) mobilize gas victims 3) present alternatives to governmental programmes 4) establish a larger network of organization to debate more systemic issues. Morcha took a revolutionary approach but lacked constructive engagement with the state. Afterwards the Bhopal Gas-Affected Women's Trade Union formed. BGPMUS protested the closing of a sewing centre and saw effective action.
In 1992, a session of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights took place in Bhopal, and in 1996, the "Charter on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights" was adopted.
In 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) met in Bhopal. Their work contributed to long-term health effects being officially recognised.
Jude Finisterra was actually Jacques Servin, a member of the activist prankster group The Yes Men. In 2002, The Yes Men issued a fake press release explaining why Dow refused to take responsibility for the disaster and started up a website, at "DowEthics.com", designed to look like the real Dow website, but containing false information.
Ingrid Eckerman, a member of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal, has been denied a visa to visit India.
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